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A B S T R A C T
Transitions intermediaries—agents who connect diverse groups of actors involved in transitions processes and
their skills, resources and expectations—are becoming more prominent in research on low-carbon transitions.
Most work, however, has focused on their ability to push innovations or emerging technologies forward, em-
phasising their involvement in disrupting incumbent regimes or firms. However, in focusing on new entrants,
often at the grassroots level, such literature runs the risk of overlooking the potentially positive role that in-
cumbent transition intermediaries—those oriented to work with or centrally consider the interests of dominant
government, market or civic stakeholders—can play in meeting sustainable energy and transport goals. In this
paper, we focus specifically on five different incumbent transition intermediaries—Smart Energy GB in the
United Kingdom, Energiesprong in the Netherlands, SULPU in Finland, CERTU in France, and the Norwegian
Electric Vehicle Association—and explain their efforts to meet socially desirable goals of accelerating innovation
or decarbonizing energy or transport systems. We ask: Why were these intermediaries created, and what pro-
blems do they respond to? How do they function? What are their longer-term strategies and aspirations? In what
ways do they reflect, reinforce, or otherwise shape incumbency? In answering these questions via a comparative
case study approach, the paper aims to make contributions to the study of incumbency and intermediation in the
context of transitions, to identifying different types of incumbent intermediaries (market, governmental, civic),
and to informing debates over energy and climate policy and politics.
1. Introduction
The decarbonisation of energy and transport systems is among the
most important international challenges facing society [1–4], with
concomitant calls for purposeful innovation with technologies, institu-
tions, behaviours, and even entire systems. Transition inter-
mediaries—agents who connect diverse groups of actors involved in
transitions processes and their skills, resources and expectations—are
becoming increasingly prominent in research on both innovation and
low-carbon transitions [5]. This is partly because intermediaries can
help overcome important system failures and deficits commonly
slowing down the development of innovations (e.g. knowledge codifi-
cation and circulation, network and alliance formation, demand ar-
ticulation) [6]. Private and corporate actors are often dependent on
start-ups or research institutes for emerging innovation opportunities
[7,8]. These actors will frequently rely in part on intermediaries to
broker access to such knowledge, foster new collaborative relation-
ships, or facilitate technology transfer [9] – particularly for path-
breaking innovation efforts.
A host of studies have generally confirmed the value that inter-
mediaries can play in innovation processes or in reconfiguring socio-
technical systems such as energy or transport. For example, Klerkx and
Leeuwis [10] argue that intermediaries fulfil a vital role in innovation
ecosystems by overcoming informational, cognitive, and managerial
gaps. Van Lente et al. [11] developed the notion of “systemic inter-
mediaries” that can link actors and coordinate innovation activities at
the level of a network, rather than an isolated technology or bilateral
relations. Moss [12] envisions intermediaries also as political actors
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serving as a go-between in addressing collective action problems, cla-
shes of interests, and conflicting values. Intermediaries have also been
found to play a critical role in negotiating and configuring innovation
processes between novel solutions and their users [13,14]. Stewart and
Hyysalo [15] suggest that collaborative functions may be more pro-
minent and warranted in the case of innovation addressing societal
needs. Others highlight that the inherently purposeful and normatively-
oriented character of sustainability transitions and related innovations
(i.e. addressing societal challenges) warrants specific kinds of inter-
mediation [5] that are more attuned to experimentation [16], institu-
tional rule-change [17], political advocacy work [18], championing
strategies [19], and an explicit focus on disrupting incumbents [10,20].
In the context of sustainability transitions, intermediation is ap-
proached as potential support for correcting asymmetries (e.g. between
challengers and incumbents) [12], catalysing bottom-up scaling me-
chanisms [21,22], or strengthening socio-technical niches from the
obstructive or predatory influence of established regimes [23]. Mignon
and Kanda [24] suggest a useful distinction between a) the scope of
intermediary action (e.g. whether they focus on niches or regimes as an
entry point, whether they target specific actors or entire systems), and
b) the kinds of recipients considered (for which they distinguish be-
tween supply-side and user-side intermediaries). Regardless, however,
they suggest that while different analytical distinctions are useful and
relevant, they do not yet offer conclusive implications tying different
kinds of intermediation types with specific functions performed. Schot
et al. [25] and Kanger and Schot [26] talk about the salient role that
“user-intermediaries” play in fostering sustainability transitions, but
never further differentiate intermediary types in their analysis.
Much work on intermediaries in transitions, such as energy, has
focused on their disruptive nature and emphasized their ability to push
“niches” or emerging technologies into socio-technical environments
[27,28,22,18]. This work connects to an initial need for protecting and
nurturing such activities from established actors and institutions
through “protective spaces” [29]. Accordingly, this body of literature
focuses on how intermediaries can facilitate processes that challenge
established regimes (e.g. through aggregation of learning, providing
advice, creating networks and aiming to shape policy) “from the ground
up”. This focus is in part explained by an overwhelming emphasis on
early stages of transitions [5] – although this is changing, notably
around the increasingly fruitful operationalisation of different forms of
niche empowerment articulating niche-regime interactions [30] and
focus on diffusion intermediaries [31].
Indeed, in focusing on breakthroughs, new entrants, and radical
novelty creation, often at the grassroots level, and possibly down-
playing the role of incumbents, such literature runs the risk of over-
looking the various roles that incumbent-oriented transition inter-
mediaries—those that centrally consider the interests of established
government, market or community stakeholders—can play in fur-
thering sustainability transitions. Initially attention was paid by
Kivimaa et al. [5] on how some transition intermediaries are tied to the
established regime via their mandate or establishment. This study ex-
pands from this starting point by exploring the ways in which a range of
market, civil or institutional intermediaries relate to incumbency. In
this context, this study maps out issues and challenges with incumbent-
oriented intermediation in the context of low-carbon or sustainability
transitions. To do so, it asks four questions about transition inter-
mediaries engaging with incumbents:
1 What problems do the intermediaries respond to?
2 How do the intermediaries function?
3 What are their longer-term visions and strategies (if any)?
4 In what ways do they reflect, reinforce, or otherwise shape incum-
bency?
These questions are addressed using a qualitative case study ap-
proach, based on a selection of five case studies assuming a variety of
incumbent-oriented intermediation functions and roles, in different
sections related to energy demand.
Answering these questions via a varied set of empirical cases is
important, as it enables us to explore the different ways of engaging
constructively with incumbency in transitions, particularly as transi-
tions dynamics acquire momentum, and in the context of renewed de-
bate about the need for deeper engagement with incumbency [32,33].
By choosing cases of intermediary actors that engage with incumbents
in the context of transitions, we empirically compensate for what we
see as an implicit bias for emphasizing the dynamics of challengers (at
the possible expense of exploring the dynamics of incumbents).1
Moreover, we explore a variety of intermediary strategies and inclina-
tions that may inform more deductive typologies. This paper is orga-
nised as follows. Section 2 outlines our conceptual approach on in-
cumbent-oriented intermediaries. Section 3 presents our research
design and case study methodology and rationale for case selection.
Section 4 presents the five empirical cases, followed by reflections and
implications in Section 5 34. Section 6 concludes.
2. Conceptual approach: Incumbency, intermediation, and
incumbent-oriented intermediaries in the context of low-carbon
transitions
In this section, we define intermediaries and their various functions
in transitions, we define incumbents and specify difficulties faced in the
context of the “dual challenge” of sustainability transitions [35], and
build on this to outline our core conceptual device of incumbent-or-
iented intermediaries.
Justifying our focus is an apparent lack of deep engagement in the
existing literature, with only rare instances of connections between the
body of work on intermediaries (i.e. innovation intermediaries, transi-
tion intermediaries) and the distinction of industry actors in terms of
their incumbency (i.e. incumbent vs. new entrant or challenger).
Indeed, a rapid review on Scopus only returned three instances where
the term “incumbent intermediary” or “incumbent intermediation” had
been explicitly used. This was in connection to general market activity
[36–38], disconnected from innovation or transition studies.
Widening our rapid review search to explicit associations between
the radicals “incumben~” and “intermedia~”, filtering out irrelevant
results, we found three articles that make some connection between the
two. Meckling and Nahm [39] focus on interest intermediation in the
context of achieving transformation towards electric vehicles. They
note how political coordination efforts may result in industry and
government actors to act as intermediaries that prioritises the interests
of incumbent companies, while political competition makes better al-
lowances to create coalitions among challengers of incumbent tech-
nology. Dodourova and Bevis [40] talk about formal and informal
networks in the European car industry, the former typically having
incumbents as members and being better resourced. Matschoss and
Heiskanen [16] describe the work of an innovation intermediary,
owned by the City of Helsinki, in Finland, in destabilising the work of
an energy incumbent. The City of Helsinki is also regarded as an in-
cumbent although not examined in the study. Their study analyses “the
mechanisms through which the intermediary interacts with incumbents
and niche actors to challenge existing regime rules” (p. 1456).
2.1. Intermediaries and intermediation functions
There are several definitions of what an intermediary is, with per-
haps the concept of financial intermediaries such as banks or credit
1 While the literature on innovation intermediaries does not carry such a bias
– and indeed engages largely with the knowledge, collaboration and technology
transfer issues of large firms – the transitions literature has to date over-
emphasised bottom-up logics which this paper in part seek to compensate for.
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unions serving as a classic example [41]. Moss ([12]: 1482) admits that
“intermediaries can take very different forms” ranging from individuals
to organizations, networks, and platforms. Howells ([42]: 720) more
specifically defines an “innovation intermediary” as “an organization or
body that acts an agent or broker in any aspect of the innovation pro-
cess between two or more parties.” Stewart and Hyysalo ([15]: p. 295)
define innovation intermediaries as “actors who create spaces and op-
portunities for appropriation and generation of emerging technical or
cultural products by others who might be described as developers and
users.” Howells [42] makes a distinction between technological diffu-
sion and transfer (for which negotiation, collaboration, and knowledge
brokering skills are key), and system transformation (for which inter-
mediaries play a much wider institutional role “in the strategic level
between the policy level and the operational level […] and how they
form an ‘ecology’ of influences on other agents within the system”
([42]:717)).
As an example, Kivimaa and Martiskainen [43] illustrate a sig-
nificant range of intermediaries operating just within the UK low-en-
ergy housing sector and its policy-innovation interface, comprising, for
example, government-initiated agencies, charities and social en-
terprises, membership organisations and network organisations. Else-
where, a range of other actors, including architects [44], building
managers [13] and religious congregations [45] have been found to
intermediate for change in this sector more locally. Schot et al. ([25]: 4)
argue that even users can function as intermediaries as they “create
space for the appropriation, shaping and alignment of the various ele-
ments of emerging socio-technical systems, such as products, infra-
structures and regulatory frameworks”. In this context, user-inter-
mediaries are important actors in a transition as they can help voice
expectations and interpretations of new technologies, influence user
needs, create user representations and connect different actors [26,25].
Overall, the literature shows a significant variety of actors that are
(at times) identified to take intermediary roles. In addition, also dif-
ferent conceptual archetypes of intermediaries are presented in the
literature. Table 1 shows 16 different intermediary actor types as well
as 10 different conceptual archetypes.
Innovation intermediaries are typically identified based on func-
tions or activities they undertake. They are understood to fulfil a variety
of bridging functions between actors’ activities, skills and resources in
relation to common challenges related to innovation processes. Indeed,
Table 2 summarizes at least 18 (!) different functions under different
processes relevant for innovation and transitions, drawn from the lit-
erature. Intermediaries can be seen as addressing significant gaps and
failures in innovation systems and processes [11,42,50], including
information, managerial, cultural and cognitive gaps [51] – although
they are not necessarily created to fulfil such explicit purposes [12]. In
the sustainability transitions literature, this activity is extended to
transforming socio-technical systems more broadly.
More recently, it has been argued that sustainability transitions call
for “ecologies of intermediaries” [5,14,43], reflecting the variety of
actors, functions, and innovations that need to be brought in alignment
to enable transitions. While such ecologies do not rule out incumbent-
oriented intermediaries, the previous literature has not conceptually
recognized or addressed such intermediaries in specific terms
[11,29,56].
Concerning institutional changes that shape transitions contexts,
common hurdles include uncertainties about the directionality of
change (e.g. inexistent, weak or confusing standards), poorly articu-
lated user preferences, norms and standards, constraining/enabling
policy change (e.g. lagging, watered down or incoherent change in
policy context), or active resistance to change from actors in established
fields. Accordingly, transition intermediaries may help address in-
stitutional system failures by a) facilitating access to decision-making
and lobbying for more stringent regulatory change [19]; b) creating and
sustaining advocacy coalitions [18], including in between conflicting
actor interests ([52]; [5]); c) articulating and shaping collective ex-
pectations [21]; d) developing and strengthening standards [55] or
certification schemes; or e) legitimising institutional change [28],
namely by generating conditions where trust can overcome prevailing
power, knowledge and resource asymmetries [57] or by empowering
emerging actors, entities or discourses to bear on or overtake estab-
lished configurations [58].
2.2. Incumbents and the dual challenge of sustainability transitions
Drawing from Johnstone et al. ([59]:152), we define incumbent
actors or institutions as those “that often have vested interests in
maintaining the status quo rather than enabling transitions and will
often act to strategically protect their privileged position” within a
given socio-technological regime. Incumbents tend to be powerful,
materially resourceful, politically influential, societally authoritative,
strategically conservative and risk-averse [32,60]. Incumbency is a
powerful competitive advantage in the context of stable economic and
socio-political environments, as it enables, among others, the fruition of
economies of scale, control over key resources, and leveraging political
Table 1
Actor types and conceptual archetypes of intermediaries.
Source: Authors compilation
Actor types that may take on intermediary
roles
Conceptual archetypes of
intermediaries
Membership organisations [46] Systemic intermediaries [11]
Government-initiated agencies [17] Strategic intermediaries [13]
Social enterprises [46] Regime-based transition
intermediaries [5]
Charities [46] Institutional intermediaries [17]
Network organisations [46] Niche intermediaries [49]
Building managers [13] Network intermediaries [43]
Architects [44] User-intermediaries [25,47]
Religious congregations [45] Process intermediaries [5]
Internet platforms [47] [14] Interpretive intermediaries [44]
Lead users [25] Middle actors [45]
Local authorities [43]
Energy agencies [48]
Innovation agencies [17]
Consultants [42]
Technology transfer agencies [42]
Universities [42]
Table 2
The varied functions of intermediaries in sustainability transitions.
Source: Authors complication
Knowledge and learning
Knowledge gathering, processing, generation and combination [42,52]
Facilitating experimentation [16,28]
Aggregation and circulation of knowledge [15,48]
Providing advice and support [10,27]
Networking
Creating and managing networks [10,15]
Translating between actors and interests [12,18]
Trust building and conflict resolution [42,53]
Brokering
Brokering by representing organizations and negotiation on their behalf [[15]]
Brokering between actors and interests [12,18]
Financial brokering by raising monetary support [15,42]
Innovation & diffusion
Innovation process management [27,42]
Technology transfer [[42]]
Connecting new technology and users [13,47]
Visioning
Articulation of expectations, requirements and visions [11,21]
Institutional
Political advocacy & lobbying [18,48]
Policy implementation [54,55]
Legitimizing institutional change [[28]]
Developing standards [[55]]
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and regulatory influence.
However, incumbency can be challenging in the face of path-
breaking innovations. Sustainability transitions present a dual chal-
lenge, as they require the development of path-breaking socio-technical
innovation at the same time as the development of new preferences,
selection criteria and changes on socio-political dimensions [35].
Incumbent actors face significant difficulties in the face of radical
innovation brought about by challengers [34], which may disrupt ex-
isting activities with acute to chronic consequences. Common ex-
planations for incumbent's difficulties include managerial cognitive
failures preventing the adequate recognition of disruptive threats
[61,62], growing misalignments with core capabilities that can turn
into core rigidities [63,64], commitments to technological compe-
tences, investment patterns [65], technological paradigms or value
networks, a tendency of established actors for exploitative innovation
over exploratory strategies [66], or deeper struggles when innovations
challenge the core mission, identity and belief structures of industry
actors [67]. Consequently, incumbents may have lower incentives to
engage with radical innovation.
Perhaps more challenging even, sustainability innovations can in-
volve new prescriptive criteria for innovative activities that are in-
herently normative and concern institutional dimensions of change.
This means that the directionality of innovation is important in sus-
tainability transitions: socio-cultural and environmental objectives can
be equally important as economic or technical objectives [68]. In some
cases, such socio-cultural and environmental objectives precede them
as a raison d’être – as in the case of low-carbon innovation that derives
its market from a need to address a societal challenge and open up
alternative innovation paths. A direct consequence of this socio-poli-
tical dimension is that innovative economic activity can become po-
larised between those advocating ambitious new paths and associated
standards (typically “niche actors”) and those supporting the status quo
(typically “regime actors”), where issues of directionality, legitimacy
and responsibility become even more central [69]. Here again, a re-
curring hypothesis is that radical sustainability innovation is more
likely to come from small new entrants than incumbents [28,29,70].
Further, those new entrants that are committed to value-based ap-
proaches [71] often derive their legitimacy from their "idealist" mission,
position themselves in distinction to established market players and
tend to have a preference for keeping innovation niches beyond the
reach of "predatory" incumbent influence (e.g. co-opting, buy-out, di-
lution or weakening of standards) [72]. At any rate, negotiating the
institutional, socio-political and normative tensions between emergent
niches and established regimes is a central theme of sustainability
transitions research - warranting an exploration of usual assumptions,
namely concerning the role of incumbents. But despite its broad scope,
and rich empirical data, such scholarship may be unduly simplifying
how it engages with incumbency and incumbents.
In order to map out how this dual challenge [35] plays out for in-
cumbents, we borrow a representation from the niche empowerment
literature ([30] [29]). This literature problematises the development
and widespread diffusion of niche-innovations as related the trans-
gressing boundaries between a) the “protected spaces” offered by socio-
technical niches (wherein innovations can be shielded from mainstream
selection pressures and nurtured to acquire greater momentum and
maturity); and b) mainstream selection environments and regimes
(wherein established actors and incumbents may benefit from inherent
advantages). Accordingly, the niche empowerment literature distin-
guishes different paths according to the degree of departure from
mainstream selection environments: fit-and-conform paths are under-
stood as “processes that make niche innovations competitive within
unchanged selection environments” while stretch-and-transform paths
are understood as “processes that contribute to changes in mainstream
selection environments in ways favourable to a path-breaking niche
innovation” [29]. Furthermore, with reference to the dual challenge of
sustainability transitions [35], we suggest disentangling technical di-
mensions, i.e. the degree to which innovations depart from existing
competences (fitting to or stretching them), from institutional dimen-
sions, i.e. the degree to which they depart from prevailing institutional
criteria and logics (conforming to or transforming them).
Figure 1 links empowerment to the dual challenge of sustainability
transitions (across technical and institutional dimensions) and applies it
to suit our specific focus on incumbency. Each quadrant provides an
ideal-typical representation of the extent to which incumbents may be
operating in a familiar or challenging space, based on combinations of
the degree to which they depart from mainstream technical and in-
stitutional dimensions. Accordingly, the background shading represents
the extent to which incumbents can be expected to find themselves out
Fig. 1. The dual challenge of transitions for incumbents
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of their comfort zone regarding e.g. core competences, institutional
criteria, or user preferences, with the top-right quadrant entailing the
more challenging situation. Furthermore, it may be posited that the
mainstreaming of innovation would entail a movement from the top-
right corner to the bottom-left corner of the solution space.
2.3. Sketching the contours of incumbent-oriented transition intermediaries
Given this dual challenge, we argue that there is a need for at-
tending specifically to what we name incumbent-oriented transition in-
termediaries, in order to address a lack of specific attention on how
transition intermediaries engage with incumbent actors. We argue that
incumbent-oriented transition intermediaries refer most broadly to
those that intermediate—i.e. connect diverse groups of actors [5]—on
behalf of or in the interest of incumbents engaged with sustainability
transitions. In doing so, we tread aware that such a distinction may be
hard to delineate: while it may be possible to identify and analytically
exclude those intermediaries that actively avoid incumbents (e.g. due to
incompatibilities with particular framings of emancipatory visions of
change), incumbent-oriented transition intermediaries are likely to man-
ifest a variety of non-exclusive forms of engagement with incumbents
and other actors. In some cases, they may be created by incumbents; in
others, they may be funded by them. In still others, they may simply
work closely with them (exclusively, punctually, or otherwise). We
offer a working definition of:
Organisations or individuals engaging knowingly and directly with
incumbent actors and their potential to contribute to innovation for
sustainability transitions, acting as agents, brokers or architects in
any aspect of the change process between two or more parties.
The distinguishing feature here is the recognition that incumbents
could support or shape transitions from the outset– an understudied
relationship in our view.
Similarly, the notion of a “regime-based transition intermediary,”
coined by Kivimaa et al [5] and used by Manders et al. [73], and de-
fined as tied to established interests or institutional arrangements ty-
pical of prevailing socio-technical regimes and explicitly mandated by
“dominant regime actors,” recognises significant scope for working
within, across, and beyond the boundaries of existing industry tem-
plates. These so-called “regime-based transition intermediaries” are
even stated to be in a position to work against other intermediaries, in
their quest to maintain the socio-technical configurations of the status
quo ([5]: 1072). So, there is a lively and emerging debate about the
interaction of transition intermediation and incumbency. Within this
debate, we suggest that our focus on incumbent-oriented transition
intermediaries is slightly broader than regime-based transition inter-
mediaries, in three main ways: 1) it is more open concerning the origin
of their mandate (which does not necessarily stem directly from regime
actors); 2) it does not presuppose a particular positioning vis-à-vis
emerging niches as it includes strategies supporting a single niche or a
multiplicity of niches (indeed, most of our cases provide evidence for
the former); 3) our intermediary cases do not seek to always disrupt the
status quo nor do they actively interrupt the activities of other inter-
mediaries.
Below we explore the role of our five incumbent-oriented inter-
mediaries along the dual challenge of sustainability transitions to
introduce path-breaking change along techno-economic boundaries and
institutional boundaries. We also recognise that path-breaking change
can take a variety of forms, from incremental to more radical, and we
problematize such distinction along a continuum.
3. Research methods: Case study approach and case selection
We relied on a qualitative case study approach. Our data collection
process included (1) a desk-based review of relevant academic litera-
ture on incumbency and intermediaries; (2) a qualitative selection of
five cases representing incumbent-oriented intermediaries in different
industrial sectors related to energy demand (see Table 3); and (3)
subsequent document analysis pertinent to each case.
In selecting our cases for exploratory purposes, we sought to max-
imize diversity of incumbent types and variation along analytically
relevant dimensions. Our cases thus represent different sectors (build-
ings, mobility, energy and heat) and different societal spheres (gov-
ernment, community, and market). Although there are clear overlaps
between these domains, we selected cases that involved:
• Governmental and regulatory incumbent-oriented intermediaries
that tend to focus on extending or retaining some sort of political
authority or policy influence over the direction and content of socio-
technical change, policy, or regulation. Their agenda is primarily to
harness innovation as means to deliver political objectives and fulfil
mandates, or to consolidate their position (e.g. role of public action,
role of local politics) by strategically extending the scope of their
influence. Some governmental intermediaries act as regulatory in-
termediaries, sitting between formal rule-makers or regulators and
rule-takers or targets [41]. They are often stipulated by law to
champion a project, e.g. organisations or bodies set up explicitly to
provide credit to low-carbon infrastructure, or the promotion of
regulatory compliance and conformity with national targets or
standards (for things like electric vehicle charging or grid stability).
Governmental intermediaries can also serve the existing “technical
bureaucracy” of the state, i.e. intermediating between different le-
vels of government (and related “mission”, in our cases public
transport and planning and smart metering) and with project im-
plementation actors (industry, mayors, project developers). Ac-
cordingly, governmental intermediaries may have a stronger man-
date to fulfil their specific function. Our case studies of this type are
Smart Energy GB, tasked with implementing the national smart
meter program throughout England, Scotland, and Wales, as well as
the government-affiliated CERTU in France.
• Market or business incumbent-oriented intermediaries that focus on
the delivery of products and services by the private sector. Their
agenda is essentially to promote particular business models, new
technologies or practices that can improve these services, generate
financial returns/savings, grow new firms or create new markets,
products or services. They include amongst others: management
consultancies; innovation hubs; trade associations, labour unions;
and business forums. Our case study examples here are the
“Energiesprong” domestic energy efficiency market development
team in the Netherlands and SULPU heat pump association in
Finland.
• Civic incumbent-oriented intermediaries that attempt to retain or
Table 3
An overview of five intermediary cases.
Intermediary Type Country Core socio-technical process supported
Smart Energy GB Government UK Promoting smart meters
Energiesprong Market NL / UK Facilitating household zero-energy efficiency retrofits
CERTU Government FR Diffusion of electric trams and reconfiguring public transport
SULPU Market FI Accelerated the diffusion of heat pumps
NEVA Civic NO Supporting battery electric vehicles
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claim control over public or civil society networks, user groups, or
individual citizens. It can include civil society organizations such as
Friends of the Earth, user associations such as the Automobile
Association, or advisory groups such as Citizens Advice, having es-
tablished themselves as primary interlocutor or representative of
users and/or citizens. Our case study example here is the user-based
Norwegian Electric Vehicle Association (NEVA).
Within these cases, because our research goals are largely ex-
ploratory (seeking to map out issues and challenges with incumbent-
oriented intermediation in the context of low-carbon transitions), our
selection of cases maximises variation along a number of dimensions,
enabling us to “obtain information about the significance of various
circumstances for case process and outcome” [74].
Accordingly, our case selection spans innovations in a variety of
sectors (energy, buildings, transport), societal realms (government,
market, users/civil society) [75], and processual focus (innovation
diffusion, system transformation) [42]. Furthermore, because our cases
discuss the role of intermediaries as related to a particular kind of in-
novation, these also present varying degrees of radicalism with respect
to established technical competences and normative criteria (we discuss
how they differ in terms of their degree of challenge for incumbents and
their technical and institutional dynamics in section 5.2). Incidentally,
the intermediaries we study also span the overlapping intermediation
roles and functions presented above in Table 1 and Table 2, which is a
running theme in the intermediaries literature [5,42,56].
Based on these five cases, we explain their efforts to meet socially
desirable goals of accelerating low-carbon innovation or decarbonizing
energy or transport systems. Each of these intermediaries reflects some
aspect of working with incumbents, addressing elements of the dual
challenge of sustainability transitions [35]. To examine each inter-
mediary, our research protocol was guided by the following operational
questions: “Why was it created, and what problems does it seek to
address?” “How does it function?” “What is its longer-term vision and
strategy?” “In what ways does it reflect, reinforce, or otherwise shape
incumbency?”
4. Results and discussion: An exploration of incumbent-oriented
transitions intermediaries in five cases
In this section, as summarized by Table 4, we examine the inter-
mediation strategies of five distinct incumbent-oriented innovation in-
termediaries. As Table 4 indicates, these intermediaries cover a mix of
different technologies (smart meters, zero energy homes, trams, electric
vehicles and heat pumps) as well as functions (from communication
and awareness to business model implementation and knowledge cir-
culation). They also operate across different spheres, from govern-
mental (involving political and regulatory entities) to market (involving
private sector and for profit entities) and civic (involving community or
user entities). Section 5 will elaborate more on these findings, after the
cases are presented.
4.1. Smart Energy GB in Great Britain (2013 to 2024)
Smart Energy GB is an independent not-for-profit company created
by the British government in 2013 to manage the communications and
engagement around the smart meter rollout to households and small
businesses in Great Britain. Although the smart meter rollout empha-
sizes consumer engagement, it has been delivered through energy firms
(incumbents as well as challengers) and the intermediary Smart Energy
GB has been the main facilitator of the consumer engagement cam-
paign. It intermediates between users on the one hand and government
and industry on the other hand.
We classify Smart Energy GB as a governmental incumbent-oriented
intermediary. It is not an energy supplier and does not install smart
meters. Its role is to ensure everyone in Great Britain understands smart Ta
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meters, the rollout and how to use their meters to get their gas and
electricity use “under control”. While its purpose is to spread the
message to consumers, Smart Energy GB has a particular duty to make
sure low-income, vulnerable and prepayment customers benefit from
smart meters. Its role in innovation is focused on the diffusion of smart
meters and improving the conditions for the diffusion of other low-
carbon technologies addressing building energy demand. Smart meters
– though not significantly challenging in technical or institutional terms
– are expected to empower consumers to act on improving the energy
performance of buildings and the adoption of low-carbon technologies
[76].
Despite relative technical simplicity and user familiarity of IT-en-
abled control devices, the scale and rate of the smart meter rollout is
demanding. Communicating with every single household in Great
Britain during the national rollout of smart meters is a monumental
technical challenge in itself, particularly so when operating within a
low interest category (Sovacool et al. 2017). The rollout is behind
schedule, with only 13.18 million meters installed after the third
quarter of 2018 (i.e. 23.5% of the 56 million meters objective [77]). As
Sovacool et al. (2017) calculated, in order to meet this target, the na-
tional smart meter campaign will need to see smart meters reach a
dissemination rate of 40,000 per day every day for the duration of the
program. This is largely why the government announced in 2019 that
the smart meter rollout deadline would be extended from end of 2020
to 2024. Nonetheless, as Figure 2 indicates, the rate of installation has
accelerated considerably since 2016 as suppliers have ramped up their
installation capacity .
To facilitate consumer engagement, Smart Energy GB is governed by
legally binding objectives to deliver the national campaign for the
British public to support the installation of smart meters in homes and
small businesses. Their long-term vision is to engage consumers across
Great Britain and raise awareness of smart meters and their benefits to
households, small businesses and the country as a whole. Smart Energy
GB also promotes behavioural change to ensure consumers use the
technology to change their attitudes towards energy consumption and
reduce their energy costs. In addition, it assesses future applications of
smart meter technology, energy data and highlights the potential for
innovation in energy products, services and tariffs.
In terms of more concrete functions, Smart Energy GB's objectives as
set out in its license are to:
• Build consumer confidence in the installation of smart metering
systems by gas and electricity suppliers;
• Deepen consumer awareness and understanding of the use of smart
metering systems (and the information obtained through them);
• Increase the willingness of energy consumers to use smart metering
systems to change their behaviour so as to enable them to reduce
their consumption of energy;
• Assist consumers with low incomes or prepayment meters, or con-
sumers who may encounter additional barriers in being able to
realise the benefits of smart metering systems due to their particular
circumstances or characteristics, to realise the benefits of smart
metering systems while continuing to maintain an adequate level of
warmth and to meet their other energy needs.
Smart Energy GB will not operate indefinitely—its license is ex-
pected to terminate by the end of the smart meter rollout, when the
program reaches its conclusion, i.e. it has been set-up as a temporary
intermediary.
We also classify Smart Energy GB as a well-resourced intermediary
that assists energy suppliers through its regulatory mandate. Although
established by a government (political) entity, their funding comes
from energy suppliers (and indirectly consumers). The energy supply
license conditions, overseen by the government gas and electricity
markets’ regulator Ofgem, set out that they must fund Smart Energy
GB's national consumer engagement campaign. The projected ex-
penditure for the whole, multi-year campaign, as set out in the Smart
Energy GB Consumer Engagement Plan 2017, is just under £224 million
(or 91 pence per household per year). The majority of this expenditure
relates to public engagement campaigns and includes advertising,
public relations, consumer research, and stakeholder communications
and events.
According to their latest Annual Report [78], the results of their
actions have been striking. Smart Energy GB has conducted more than
100,000 interviews with consumers to shape their campaign, have 58
million combined views of their promotional films on YouTube, and
have trained 180 people across 88 different organizations to deliver
smart meter information to local communities. To channel these funds
and coordinate these activities, Smart Energy GB currently relies on 81
staff and 14 board members consisting of experts on marketing, beha-
vioural change, and energy consumption. The key pillar of their
Fig. 2. Quarterly and overall installation of electricity and gas smart meters in Great Britain, 2012-2018
Source: Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (2018).
B.K. Sovacool, et al. Energy Research & Social Science 66 (2020) 101490
7
strategy involves awareness, outreach, and advertising. Throughout
2017, they promoted a slew of different messages and advertisements
across print, television, radio, and other audio-visual channels (in-
cluding social media and YouTube). These reached 98 percent of adults
within Great Britain an average of 46 times across the calendar year
[78]. They have also tailored their messages to young adults, the el-
derly, and children. For instance, SEGB implemented a campaign tar-
geting 21 to 28 year olds through social media and short films as well as
a “Smart Ideas” website (with tips on saving energy) which received
almost 200,000 visits. They targeted people over the age of 65 without
personal internet access by working with television stars (such as those
appearing on MasterChef or the Great British Bake-Off) to hold low-
energy cookery events, as well as a campaign featuring 1960s media
icon Twiggy to develop “supersized in-home display” portraits. They
lastly ran a three month pilot among 12 primary and secondary schools
in Wales to raise energy saving awareness among young children.
Consequently, through these efforts as a whole the Smart Energy Out-
look claims that about 19 million adults without a smart meter state
that they would accept one within the next six months, and that 82% of
people who have adopted a smart meter have done at least one thing to
save energy within their home [78].
Finally, Smart Energy GB reinforces incumbency in multiple ways.
As already mentioned, they work closely with large energy suppliers
(those with more than 250,000 domestic customers), who have the
legal responsibility to set the results that they would like Smart Energy
GB to achieve. This includes incumbents such as British Gas, EDF
Energy, E.ON, Scottish Power, and SSE (among others). However, their
furthering of incumbency extends well beyond that. Their public rela-
tions activity has centred on industries and media from the hair-
dressing, hospitality, construction, retail and environmental sectors.
Smart Energy GB has explicitly worked with 20 employers with a po-
tential staff reach of 1.4 million to promote smart meters, including
large organisations such as Skyscanner, Hilton Hotels, Adnams Brewers,
TfL and the NHS. They have worked closely with governmental in-
cumbents including promoting smart meters among 141 elected re-
presentatives across England, Wales, and Scotland as well as 40 local
councils. Sovacool et al. [79] add that the smart meters being promoted
by Smart Energy GB can benefit incumbents in myriads ways, from the
use of “big data” to better understand consumption profiles to the dif-
fusion of energy storage devices, lower cost of pre-payment meters,
remote reading and the avoidance of home calls, remote switching and
disconnection, better services from energy companies, enhancing the
use of energy management tools or contractors, and improving the ef-
ficiency and performance of national and local grids.
So, Smart Energy GB engages with end users of smart meters on
behalf of incumbent energy interests (energy suppliers, grid operators,
government) in the context of a top-down technological rollout pro-
gramme. The primary focus of its intermediation activities is to improve
societal acceptance of this rollout and to “grease the social cogs” of its
implementation.
4.2. Energiesprong in the Netherlands (2013 to present)
Energiesprong, the “energy leap” initiative, was established in the
Netherlands in 2013 (also now in the UK and France). It serves as an
example of a market intermediary that promotes business model in-
novation for residential energy efficiency retrofits and zero carbon
homes [80]. We classify it as a market intermediary, because it focuses
on business model and market development, bringing together housing
providers, construction firms, other private sector entities, government
and the finance community to rethink how energy efficiency is deliv-
ered and financed at scale.
Under the Energiesprong model, a “market development team”
brings together these stakeholders to implement integrated energy
service business models for residential low carbon retrofits.
Energiesprong market development teams do not undertake the retrofit
measures, or provide the guarantees themselves, but instead act as an
intermediary between the housing provider, government and con-
tractors – essentially designing and implementing a radically new
business model for the sector. This has typically involved a more in-
dustrialised approach to retrofits, one that utilizes “off-site” manu-
facturing of prefabricated components, driving down the cost for whole
house retrofits through economies of scale and process innovation.
In the Energiesprong business model, customers are offered a
comprehensive whole house retrofit, based on a guarantee of net-zero
energy consumption. The Energiespong model promotes a “mass pro-
duction” approach to the supply chain. This involves the factory or
offsite production of insulated wall facades and modules that are in-
tegrated with renewable heat and power systems, drastically reducing
installation times to less than a week and minimizing disruption [81].
The contractor then offers a 30-year energy performance guarantee for
net zero energy consumption amortized over the calendar year. To
achieve these cost reductions and enable energy performance guaran-
tees to be offered, significant process innovation is required [82].
Interestingly, Energiesprong's mission is only temporary:
In the Netherlands we are five years in and have reached a tipping
point… There will come a time when we are obsolete because the
market has been created. (Energiesprong UK)
Thus, they focus intently on creating the conditions for sustainable
uptake of retrofit innovations that will eventually no longer require
intermediation [81]. Figure 3 summarizes the proposition to the cus-
tomer from an Energiesprong retrofit.
In terms of resources, Energiesprong was initially funded through a
€45m grant from the Dutch government, and the setting up of the
market development team, also now funded by membership contribu-
tions. A UK trial is now underway having secured funding through the
EU Interreg scheme. It is hoped that the model will eventually become
viable without subsidy. Approximately 1800 homes in the Netherlands
have implemented Energiesprong “net zero” energy guarantees, of
which 500 are new build and the remaining are pure retrofits, largely
focusing on single-family semi-detached or terraced units [84]. Over
this period, installation times have declined from two weeks to as
quickly as one day. Its mid- to long-term plans are to scale up to
111,000 households in the Netherlands and to expand to France and the
United Kingdom.
Energiesprong's market creation intermediation pushes boundaries
along both dimensions of the dual challenge of transitions: the solution
put forward challenges existing practices and technologies through
radical process innovation, and challenges existing criteria in the con-
struction sector (seeking to harmonize and “cement”, as it were, zero-
energy performance criteria in investment patterns). It engages with a
new value proposition by seeking to reconcile high performance with
low costs. The business model has thus far largely been trialled in the
social housing sector, due to advantages concerning the relative uni-
formity of social housing estates, scalar effects, and the simplicity of
dealing with large single clients. Additionally, social housing providers
and municipal councils are potential early adopters as they have ob-
ligations to meet social and environmental goals for their tenants.
Lastly, Energiesprong shapes incumbency as their partnerships fa-
cilitate interactions with incumbent housing providers, construction
companies (large UK and Dutch contractors Mears, Wilmott Dixon and
VolkerWessels are members), trade bodies, energy efficiency suppliers
as well as expert partners and policymakers, particularly at the local
authority level. Moreover, it attempts to strengthen supply chains and
the market base of retrofit service providers, seeking to “catalyse that
innovation process - a large demand volume that collectively asks for a
different type of offering from construction companies based on per-
formance requirements instead of technical solutions” ([84]: 5). Its
outcome-based procurement processes therefore seek to accelerate in-
novation primarily in incumbent construction firms. Its business plat-
form is predicated on scaling up and reconfiguring these patterns of
B.K. Sovacool, et al. Energy Research & Social Science 66 (2020) 101490
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incumbency—as it notes, “these types of innovations will only happen if
there is scale” ([84]: 13); if retrofit service providers develop packages
that can be produced in flexible factors yet personalized with different
components according to consumer preferences. As they note “only
such a large volume of articulated demand will convince construction
companies” to participate ([84]: 12).
4.3. CERTU in France (1994 to 2014)
CERTU (Assessment Centre for Networks, Transport, Urbanism and
Public Works) was created in 1994 by national decree along with a
reorganisation of the Ministry of Urbanism, Housing and Transport in
France. It was established by fusing together the CETUR (Study Centre
on Urban Transports) and the STU (Technical Service for Urbanism),
both created in 1976. It was a governmental administrative and tech-
nical body serving as a technical competence centre with a mission to
conduct relevant studies for the state, local authorities, or other public
organisations [85]. We classify CERTU as a governmental (adminis-
trative) intermediary because it coordinates between state functions
and more specialised and local governance and expertise. CERTU
ceased to exist in 2014 when it was merged into a similar body with a
broader remit including environmental, risk, and planning issues
(CEREMA). We specifically discuss its role in the development and
diffusion of modern tram technology as alternative urban public
transport option.
Its primary functions were the provision of information and ex-
pertise, diffusion of best practices, circulation of experts, and normal-
isation and standardisation support. It was further linked to regional
counterparts (CETEs, or Technical and Equipment Study Centres),
which it "spearheaded", and to which it commissioned many local stu-
dies. It also collaborated with the National Federation of Urban
Planning Agencies (FNAU) as well as the Grouping of Transport
Regulatory Authorities (GART).
CERTU's competences and actions involved inherently decentralised
government functions. It can be considered a governmental competence
centre, primarily involved in the knowledge accumulation and circu-
lation function, with a rather broad portfolio of competences. CERTU's
main activities were linked to the development of technical knowledge
and knowhow and to assist in their circulation. CERTU concentrated
relevant expertise and acted as a centre for knowledge aggregation and
diffusion for the various actors involved in public transport projects
[86]. Outputs included the development of relevant statistics, surveys,
expert opinions, technological innovation and experimentation, tech-
nical advice manuals and training workshops. It also participated to the
framing and shaping of visions, namely by contributing to the devel-
opment of technical standards, norms and regulations. In terms of trams
specifically, CERTU focused intently on standards, problem-solving,
and learning, whereas the professionalization of service-oriented in-
termediaries (e.g. technical consultancies and design studios) made
local implementation easier and more appealing to clients and the
general public.
Turnheim and Geels [87] write that CERTU developed technical
manuals and evaluation guidelines on trams, conducted user observa-
tions and surveys, and contributed to guidelines for evaluation and
learning. Through this technical support, CERTU exerted a significant
influence on the overall diffusion of trams in France, and specific
adoption by local authorities. Although trams had widely diffused in
European (and French) cities in the early twentieth century, most net-
works had been dismantled by the 1950s. The development of “modern
trams” in France from the 1970s hence constituted an entirely new
proposition, which required dedicated innovation and new institutional
strategies. Modern trams first emerged locally as radical interventions
on behalf of urban planners seeking to challenge the material and in-
stitutional dominance of the private car [87]. CERTU's main role then
was to address technical knowledge deficits in the inherently technical
aspects of tram design and performance, particularly intermediating
knowledge (urban to national, national to local, project to project) with
a view at consolidating, circulating, and shaping technical criteria.
In addition, CERTU, along with other organs of state coordination,
was instrumental in the success of the development of a “French tram
school”, notably by supporting successful implementation projects. This
generated additional coherence to a multi-level expertise network
supporting government action, reinforcing a strategically guided vision
to develop modern trams around values of technological excellence
with high export potential [87]. CERTU thus structured the emerging
knowledge and competence in the field of local tramway project im-
plementation, making highly technical issues accessible to local deci-
sion-makers and enabling the circulation of experts. With support from
CERTU, Figure 4 reveals how the tramway proposition in France grew
considerably, expanding to 25 urban areas as of 2016, 1.6 million an-
nual journeys recorded, and hundreds of kilometres of new track being
installed [88].
Fig. 3. Customer proposition of an Energiesprong Retrofit
Source: Energiesprong [83]
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The CERTU case has an additional level of ambition insofar as it
sought to contribute to a domestic blueprint for modern trams that
could be later exported, in conjunction with other public bodies and a
strong national industrial partner. Alstom [89], the main French
tramway rolling stock manufacturer, claimed that 2300 Citadis tram-
ways have been sold worldwide since 2000. Many other companies are
now exporting skills and knowledge (e.g. project development and
construction for Veolia, operations for Keolis and SNCF), with 100
modern tramway lines in 15 different countries built or supplied by
French companies [90].
As such, CERTU was a comparatively well-funded intermediary.
Although it received a guaranteed line item from the state budget, it
also benefitted separately from more regional CETE work. In 2010, it
had almost 170 experts (over 40 of which were dedicated to “transport
infrastructures and services”) and an overall budget of €14.5 million for
the entire institution. The scope and strategic relevance of its activities
further explains the size of this budget.
CERTU has cemented forms of incumbency in various ways. Most
directly, CERTU was particularly instrumental in supporting the local
implementation of tramways, hence supporting diffusion by making
tram adoption decisions at the municipal level more streamlined and
accessible. This, of course, has benefitted incumbent actors from
neighbouring regimes such as the railway industry (in large part
Alstom) as well as urban planning and state strategic interests. As such,
Fig. 4. Growth of the French tram network
a. Top panel: Modern tramway diffusion in French cities (solid line: tramways; dotted line: tramways and rubber-tired tramways) (Source: [87])
b. Bottom panel: number of kilometres of public transport in dedicated corridor brought into service annually (past and projected) (Source: Ministry for Ecology,
Sustainable Development and Energy [88].
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CERTU did not “arbitrate” for or against the tram, but rather con-
tributed to its success by lifting some of the knowledge and expertise
barriers and systematising learning. Governmental incumbents such as
those at the Ministry of Transport or frontrunner committed mayors
also worked with and drew from CERTU's expertise, as did a larger
number of actors fulfilling emerging intermediary positions such as
technical consultancies and design studios. Most broadly CERTU has
reinforced the perceived effectiveness of state action on public trans-
port by bringing together “recipes that worked” or in which the French
State had vested interests.
4.4. Finnish Heat Pump Association (SULPU) in Finland (1999 to present)
The Finnish Heat Pump Association (SULPU) was established in
1999 with the aim of creating a credible heat pump market (air to air,
air to water, exhaust air, and ground source heat pumps) in Finland (
[91]). It is another example of a market intermediary. It is a trade as-
sociation established by a heat pump reseller, an educator researching
heat pumps at a university and the government energy efficiency
agency. Its founder, Jussi Hirvonen, became a “champion” for heat
pump technology in 1994. He set up a heat pump consultancy business
and raised awareness directly with customers through information days
he held across 150 Kesko hardware stores [92]. Hirvonen also estab-
lished technical and installation training for store staff.
SULPU was created in order to bring disparate heat pump compa-
nies (incumbent and new) together to generate a common, credible
channel for promoting heat pumps to government, ministries and other
public authorities, as well as the media. SULPU has described heat
pumps as a fairly affordable and modular way to decarbonize the
household heating sector in Finland, displacing fossil fuels, increasing
self-sufficiency, and meeting European targets for energy efficiency si-
multaneously [14,93]. To fulfil this promise, the heat pump sector also
needed better standards, especially for training, certification and
quality control. Certification schemes for both heat pumps and in-
stallers were important for creating customer confidence [94], and to-
gether with training had the potential to improve the expertise and
credibility of the industry in the early 2000s .
SULPU thus contributed toward these standards, and it also created
links with international associations and organisations, such as the
European Heat Pump Association ([95]) and the IEA Technology Col-
laboration Programme on Heat Pumping Technologies [96], transfer-
ring knowledge from other countries to Finland [97]. Finland was ac-
cepted as an official member of EHPA's quality control committee in
2009, and a national quality committee was established, consisting of
three heat pump manufacturers, Sitra (Finnish Innovation Fund), SKLL
(Finnish Refrigeration Enterprises Association), SuLVI (Finnish HVAC
Association) and VTT (Technical Research Centre of Finland) [98].
Lastly, one of SULPU's aims was to develop tools to track and compile
statistics on the sector's development and growth and they have pro-
vided these since 1996 (see [99]). SULPU's strategy has been to “in-
fluence heat pump sector development in national and international
networks” and “support the growth of the sector, provide training and
improve quality together with legislators and authorities.” ([93],
translated from Finnish, p.n/a). This includes targeted activities such as
aiming to influence policymakers and other key stakeholders especially
when new regulation or decrees have been planned or prepared.
Perhaps SULPU's greatest impact on the Finnish heat pump market
has been to create a common, trusted voice for the sector [97], active
political lobbying and the creation of policy incentives. SULPU orga-
nises an annual heat pump day which has often been attended by
ministerial level stakeholders [92], showing activity has been re-
cognised at government level. The association was, for example, the
recipient of the Finnish Government's Renewable Energy Action Prize in
2009 . Heiskanen et al. [91] give SULPU credit for legitimising heat
pumps within national and EU policy. During 2008-2010, significant
lobbying by SULPU (and the European Heat Pump Association) to get
heat pumps recognised as a renewable resource under the Renewable
Energy Directive was successful. This subsequently led heat pumps to
be included in the national energy aid in Finland in 2011-2012. As part
of that policy, which provided grants for building heating system re-
novations, heat pumps received 20 million Euros, increasing sales by
72% compared to previous year [92]. SULPU was also actively involved
in the setting up of the Finnish Clean Energy Association in 2013 [92],
an umbrella organisation for renewable energy in Finland, and Hir-
vonen sits on its board [100].
In 2018 SULPU had 164 members, consisting of companies im-
porting heat pumps, manufacturers, resellers, installers, designers and
training organisations. It has a dozen associated members and a few
individual private members located across Finland. SULPU's annual
turnover is just over 200,000 Euros. The association is financed mostly
by membership fees (80%), and by project funding, income from ad-
vertising on their website, and training and certification fees (20%).
Hirvonen's firm RESplus Oy provides executive management services to
the association and SULPU buys external administration services for six
months of the year. As Heiskanen et al. [91] have noted, “Since SULPU
was established, the heat pump sector has started to emerge from
fumbling attempts by small local companies to co-operate into a glob-
ally relevant industry” (p.1898). In April 2018, there were approxi-
mately 850,000 installed heat pumps in Finland, a country with a po-
pulation of 5.5 million people, following steady diffusion (see Figure 5).
There are three Finnish heat pump manufacturers (Gebwell, Oilon and
Lämpöässä), while most international models (e.g. Daikin, Hitachi,
Mitsubishi, Panasonic, Toshiba) are also available on the Finnish
market. Approximately 70% of new built small houses choose a heat
pump [101], and roughly 5,000 oil boilers are replaced with a heat
pump each year [101].
SULPU's efforts intercede with those of existing incumbents in
multiple ways. Interestingly, it was founded in close connections with
Rovaniemi University of Applied Sciences (the university was devel-
oping a heat pump testing and teaching laboratory) and Motiva (the
Finnish energy efficiency agency). Hirvonen, meanwhile, had his own
connections with IVO (Finnish nuclear power plant operator where he
had worked as an energy technology engineer for 10 years prior to
getting into heat pumps) and IVT Industrier AB (Swedish heat pump
manufacturer which became world number one in 2004 before being
acquired by multinational company Bosch) [92]. Hirvonen also faced
resistance in his early heat pump days from other incumbents, espe-
cially the oil heating sector who questioned heat pump technology
[92]. Essentially, SULPU's primary mission has been to use its connec-
tions with multiple incumbents to grow the Finnish heat pump market.
However, at the same time, it has worked against other incumbents in
the energy sector, including the established district heating regime and
oil-based heating. Over time, it has transformed from a “niche” actor to
an incumbent intermediary. SULPU's longer term plan is to double the
size of the sector from 0.5 billion Euros to 1 billion Euros by 2025,
perhaps also doubling in size institutionally.
So, rather than radically stretching technical aspects (heat pumps
technology being relatively mature), SULPU focussed on transforming
institutional dimensions towards greater legitimacy and acceptability of
heat pumps, firmly embedding the industry in the renewable energy
landscape.
4.5. Norwegian Electric Vehicle Association (NEVA) (1995 to present)
The Norwegian Electric Vehicle Association (NEVA), or Norsk el-
bilforening, was created in 1995. The organization was then called
“Norstart” and was established by actors who wanted to both promote
the development of an EV industry in Norway (a commercial goal) but
also enthusiastically endorse a favoured and exciting form of mobility
(a social goal). It changed its name to the Norwegian Electric Vehicle
Association in 2011 and the organization became more focused only on
consumers. NEVA seeks to be the “first choice” for EV owners when it
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comes to representing their interests; it also seeks to create a critical
mass to lobby for improved conditions, regulation, and infrastructure in
support of EVs. NEVA ([102]: 1) argues that they already represent “the
majority of electric car owners in Norway.” Haugneland et al. ([103]: 2)
write that “the Norwegian EV Association represents the Norwegian EV
owners and cooperates with policy makers, the electric car industry and
other organizations for the successful introduction of electric vehicle.”
It is now entirely user led and mostly user funded; it operates according
to a charter and mission; and despite its quasi-commercial focus (sti-
mulating industry), it is also not-for-profit.
One core function NEVA fulfils is to provide an important source of
information and guidance regarding electric mobility for governmental
institutions, local authorities, researchers and private consumers. For
instance, NEVA conducts independent consumer research. Every year
since 2012, they have designed and managed a national survey among
EV owners, one which has fairly high response rates (between 21% and
33%, depending on the year) and a large sample (7,780 respondents in
2015) [104]. The survey has noted, for example, that current EV de-
signs can fulfil most of the traveling needs of drivers in terms of ad-
dressing range anxiety, as well as considering EV as primary vehicle
(not secondary); that respondents become more conscious about their
energy use after they bought their EV; and that one-quarter state they
will consider installing a solar panel on their house. Other forms of
knowledge building include contributing to the World Electric Vehicle
Journal and organizing an annual conference and convention (the
“Nordic Electric Vehicle Summit”). A final function is that NEVA pro-
vides consultancy regarding EVs and charging, especially charging
consultancies directed at apartment or multi-unit housing.
As both Norstart and the NEVA, the organization is funded by its
members. It charges an annual membership fee of about 50 euros (460
NOK), which supports most of its operations, although it receives some
state funding. As of early 2018, it had more than 60,000 members and
22 employees, although this is set to expand considerably, given that 7
new employees had already been hired in 2018 with three more ex-
pected. Based in part on NEVA's leadership, sales of both battery elec-
tric vehicles and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles have grown con-
siderably, making Norway a European and global leader [105]; as
Figure 6 also summates, more than 200,000 EVs were on the road in
Norway at the end of 2017. NEVA has also exerted a significant impact
on national policy, with the Norwegian Parliament deciding (based on
NEVA input) on a national goal that all new car sales in 2025 will be
EVs. The national government goal is to reach 400,000 EVs in Norway
by 2020. They also aim to “promote Norway as a best case for electric
vehicles policy to Europe and the rest of the world” ([102]: 2).
In terms of incumbency, NEVA collaborates closely with incumbent
car producers (such as Nissan, Volkswagen, and Honda) as well as
newer entrants (such as Tesla), charging operators, the Norwegian
government, and environmental organizations, among others. When
they were Norstart, they worked to promote a Norwegian EV industry
(Buddy and Think) by creating a network for the industrial actors of
EVs in Norway. To accomplish this mission, Norstart promoted eco-
nomic incentives for EVs such as the exemption of regular purchase tax,
exemption of company car tax and free parking, which did strengthen
the power of the industry. Haugneland et al. [103] note that the NEVA's
mission is to work with incumbents, as they seek to offer “valuable
input” to Norwegian planners and EV industrial firms. As such, NEVA is
a member of both the European Association for Electromobility
(AVERE) and the World Electric Vehicle Association (WEVA).
5. Reflection and implications: Intermediation processes,
strategies, and future research
Our cases reveal the rich mosaic of disparate motives for the reasons
incumbent-oriented intermediaries were set up (whether their origins
were governmental, market or civic oriented), the functions that they
fulfil and activities conducted. Knowledge brokerage, knowledge cir-
culation and networking between actors were the primary inter-
mediation functions performed in our cases, in clear connection to the
core functions of innovation intermediaries (e.g. [15,42]), but we also
see evidence of important institutional work being performed by in-
termediaries (e.g. developing standards, lobbying and influencing
policy frameworks). Table 5 offers a comparative overview of the key
intermediation functions and activities observed in our different cases,
based on the distinctions synthesised from the literature, suggesting
that they all cover a similar breadth of intermediation activities.
The remainder of this section discusses a number of findings arising
from our specific focus on incumbent-oriented intermediaries, and the
extent to which this orientation shapes intermediation strategies and
activities.
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Fig. 5. Cumulative installations of heat pumps in Finland, 2006 to 2017
Source: Modified from [14] and SULPU 2018.
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5.1. Some incumbents engage proactively with transitions and can be
assisted by incumbent-oriented intermediaries to address related challenges
Our cases confirm that incumbents (with significant expertise,
capabilities, legitimacy related to working “at the large scale”) can
become privileged partners for market diffusion (e.g. the execution of
roll-out programmes such as Smart Energy GB). Furthermore, involving
incumbents in the fulfilling of societal missions may become particu-
larly important when there is high-level political momentum and
commitment around a particular technical option (as in the case of
Smart Energy GB, NEVA, SULPU), or when material and infrastructural
lock-ins are interpreted as requiring change from within (as in the case
of Energiesprong), justifying transformative strategies that leverage the
significant resources and influence that certain incumbent actors may
possess. In other cases, incumbent-oriented intermediaries benefit from
a drive for flagship industrial development to draw from existing cap-
abilities in pursuing new goals. In such cases, certification and standard-
setting are often interpreted as benefiting from the authoritative cred-
ibility linked to incumbency (e.g. “state action” and “technical ex-
pertise” for CERTU, “technical expertise” and “international embedd-
edness” for SULPU).
5.2. Incumbent-oriented intermediation strategies are further determined by
their specialisation and processual focus
Our cases also exhibit, or at least reflect, a variety of strategies and
tactics of intermediaries engaging with incumbent actors. Two dimen-
sions are particularly relevant. First, intermediation strategies differ
according to the specialisation of incumbents considered, whether these
are a) specialists in the focal domain (e.g. energy incumbents engaging
with energy transitions), or b) specialists in a different domain (e.g. ICT
incumbents engaging with energy and/or mobility transitions). Second,
intermediation strategies differ according to the kind of process con-
sidered, whether this is a) supporting the development and diffusion of
innovation, or b) supporting organisational transformation (through
e.g. re-skilling and diversification strategies).
Concerning our cases, Table 2 (above) shows that most of the in-
termediaries examined have a narrow set of technical competences,
related to a specific sector (e.g. Energiesprong) or even a specific
technological option therein (e.g. Smart Energy GB, NEVA, SULPU),
while some have much broader technical competences (e.g. CERTU).
The cases also show evidence of involvement in different processes
relevant to low-carbon transitions. Smart Energy GB is stewarding the
Fig. 6. Share and volume of electric vehicle adoption in Norway, 2010-2017
a. Top panel: percentage of new car sales
b. Bottom panel: overall fleet of electric vehicles
Source: [102].
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adoption of 56 million electricity and gas smart meters (connected to
in-home displays) across homes and small businesses in England,
Scotland, and Wales. Energiesprong is seeking to create a self-sustaining
market for zero energy retrofits in which it is no longer even needed as
an intermediary. CERTU played an instrumental role in the develop-
ment and local implementation of French trams. SULPU is aiming to
create new patterns of incumbency that favour low-carbon heat pumps
in Finland and across Europe. NEVA is seeking the adoption of 400,000
EVs in Norway by 2020. However, each case represents a particular
way of supporting low-carbon transitions that differs from bottom-up
niche development that is comparatively more oriented towards a)
enabling change of existing infrastructures and systems from within (e.g.
Smart Energy GB, Energiesprong, NEVA), and b) mobilising existing
capabilities and actors from neighbouring domains (e.g. CERTU, En-
ergiesprong).
Mobilising or engaging with incumbent energy actors in support of
transitions in the energy sector is perhaps the more intuitive kind of
tactic, and is linked to arguments about technology- or sector-specific
skills, expertise, market presence, visibility, and political alliances.
Smart Energy GB illustrates the diffusion-oriented end of this spectrum,
an aspect of intermediation also discussed in Bergek [31]. Smart Energy
GB is inscribed in a deliberate strategy of working with incumbents in
the British electricity sector and has focussed on mobilising existing
transactional arrangements (between large energy suppliers and final
users) as a conduit for the governmental rollout of a specific metering
technology. Energiesprong illustrates the other end of the spectrum, as
it primarily engages with a variety of heterogeneous incumbents from
within the building/construction, social housing and distributed energy
industries to support the significant market transformation of the
building stock towards higher efficiency standards. Many of the other
cases fall between these poles of the spectrum.
Concerning those intermediaries involving actors from neigh-
bouring regimes, CERTU is noteworthy as it mobilises its technical
expertise (i.e. transport and urban planning) in support of a much
broader portfolio of innovations and actors, relying in this case on a
capacity to aggregate and translate technical information. In its specific
involvement with tramway technology as a public transport alternative,
it has primarily engaged in supporting development and diffusion
(through e.g. knowledge circulation and standardisation). Similarly,
Energiesprong is all about bringing together housing providers, con-
struction companies but also distributed energy providers to create net
zero energy buildings.
So, specialism and processual focus emerge as crucial markers of
intermediation strategies and intermediaries enacting them. This link
indicates that some incumbent-oriented intermediaries may also
sometimes be niche intermediaries (cf. [5], concurrently or in the past
(e.g. SULPU, NEVA).
5.3. Progress with transitions on the ground is likely to determine
intermediation strategies
We may expect a stronger degree and perceived need of incumbent-
oriented innovation intermediation in cases where shared under-
standing about the need to act on societal challenges has emerged, or
innovative alternative solutions are sufficiently developed to warrant a
shift towards their mainstreaming. This is specifically illustrated in the
cases of Smart Energy GB, CERTU and NEVA, for which intermediaries
support the deployment of specific innovations once they have acquired
a degree of maturity. What the SULPU and NEVA cases also reveal is
that intermediaries can become incumbent actors and adopt more in-
cumbent-oriented strategies over their lifetime.
This last finding is largely aligned with observations within the field
about a new phase of energy transitions, which presents quantitative
shifts (accelerated diffusion) along with significant qualitative shifts
(e.g. increasing focus on system interactions and integration, political
and competitive struggles), and are likely to lead to greater engagementTa
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of incumbent actors [106,107]. Accordingly, this particular phase of
development is likely to raise the salience of incumbent-oriented in-
termediation strategies. For this reason, these actors become increas-
ingly interesting and relevant to research.
The transient nature of intermediation and intermediation contexts
is also highly relevant, but under-examined. A central question con-
cerns the organisational fate of particular intermediaries, i.e. whether
intermediation is likely to persist, or be needed, through time, whether
intermediaries are disbanded, retreat, or re-create themselves once
their mission is accomplished (cf. [5], see also [108]). Those inter-
mediaries with the broadest remit (e.g. CERTU) are most likely to
survive the test of time, as they perform intermediation functions along
a number of fronts (multiple domains, actors, technologies, and
spheres) and their existence does not hinge upon a technology-specific
mission. On the other side of the spectrum, the Energiesprong case
clearly shows that intermediaries with a more specific mission are likely
(or even plan) to be disbanded once said mission is accomplished.
6. Conclusion
Incumbents do not always stifle low-carbon innovations or socially
desirable practices and technologies - particularly when they are en-
abled by dedicated innovation intermediaries. Incumbent-oriented in-
termediaries may facilitate or enable specific kinds of transformative/
systemic change, and address various aspects of the dual challenge of
transitions [35] accordingly. In this study, we explored the contours of
five incumbent-oriented transition intermediaries, why and how they
were set up, what kinds of action they engage with, and the nature of
their influence over the directionality of sociotechnical change.
Our case studies show that incumbent-oriented intermediation
strategies, in the way we define them, can be observed in the realm of
low-carbon transitions; these can be distinguished from intermediation
strategies that actively avoid engagement with incumbent actors, but
also those that seek only to maintain the status quo or interrupt other
progressive intermediaries. Furthermore, our cases provide evidence
that many of the traditional functions played by transitions inter-
mediaries can be found in the strategies of incumbent-oriented inter-
mediaries. Based on a very small sample, we can only intuit on the
specificities of incumbent-oriented intermediation strategies, but in all
our cases (and despite the intentional variety of our cases) we found a
strikingly large number of functions being performed by each inter-
mediary, as well as a particular emphasis on institutional functions.
Perhaps just as important, we confirm that incumbent-orientation is
a topic worthy of interest, namely insofar as it likely bounds the scope
of transition pathways supported (i.e. more reformist and reconfigura-
tional than revolutionary), determines related intermediation strate-
gies, and enables the exploration of a significant variety of forms.
Ultimately, our findings demand that we overcome the somewhat
problematic assumption that transitions only come from radical out-
siders (radical transformation), and that there may be a fruitful role for
reconfigurational transformation (in which incumbents may have a role
to play). On the contrary, incumbent actors may indeed be seeking to
work with or create intermediaries to heed off the kind of creative
destruction that such radical innovation may present to their existing
activities. In this way, they are seeking to survive the evolutionary
process of transition by having a stake in change and in so doing are
already significantly shaping change (i.e. slowing down, accelerating,
re-orienting, capturing, transitions in-the-making). Even incumbents
involved in existing regimes can play an active role in niche develop-
ment or regime reconfiguration, and we find evidence of how inter-
mediaries enable such involvement.
We thus contribute to a growing subtlety in transitions studies that
seeks to overcome the original “David vs. Goliath” myth and focusses
on the various modes in which incumbents engage with transition ef-
forts, the means mobilised, and the outcomes this is having on trans-
formation pathways. This calls for more qualified understandings of the
nature and processes involved in transformative struggles that can
support greater engagement with the (non-)desirability of pathways
and related strategies. Conceptual moves towards a typology of in-
cumbent-oriented intermediaries would need to further elaborate on
some of the dimensions explored in section 5, build on empirical evi-
dence from other sectors, as well as seek to draw from the contrasting
features of incumbent-oriented vs incumbent-avoiding intermediation
strategies.
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